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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Appellant Greg N. Oliver appeals his conviction of burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1989) and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1989) on the bases that the trial court 
erred in denying his motion for a continuance and that admissible 
evidence supports only a misdemeanor theft conviction. We affirm 
in part, and reverse and remand in part. 
BACKGROUND 
At 2:30 p.m. on January 7, 1989, John Spielmans returned home 
from a basketball game with his son. He noticed that the side 
door to his garage, which was usually locked, was open. 
Spielmans went into the garage to investigate. He then saw a man 
dressed in a dark cap and dark jacket jump over a chain link 
fence ten to twelve feet away and run north. Spielmans began 
chasing the man, but lost sight of him. Spielmans returned home 
and noticed that the front door to his house was dented and that 
it appeared someone had been inside the house. He called 911 and 
waited outside for the police to arrive. While he was waiting, 
one of Spielmans's neighbors called his attention to a man who 
was leaning against a wooden fence across the street. Noting the 
similarity of that person's clothing to that of the man he had 
observed running away, Spielmans concluded it was the same 
person, Spielmans walked toward the manf who began running 
toward a car parked nearby. The man got into the car and looked 
over his left shoulder as Spielmans approached him and said, "It 
wasn't me, man" before driving off. Spielmans again called 911 
and described the car, including the license plate number and the 
direction of travel. 
When Deputy Matthews arrived to investigate, Spielmans told 
him that a watch, a gold ring, four one-dollar bills and four or 
five gold Canadian coins were missing from his house. Deputy 
Matthews also spoke with Spielmans's neighbor who saw the man run 
across his front yard, climb into the parked car and speed away 
when Spielmans approached him. 
Deputy Matthews ran a computer check on the license plate of 
the car and obtained the vehicle owner's name and address. He 
then went to the vicinity of that address to investigate further. 
He saw a man fitting the description that Spielmans had given, 
exit the vehicle owner's residence. 
Based on his own observations, the license plate number of the 
car and the descriptions given by both Spielmans and his 
neighbor, Deputy Matthews obtained a picture of defendant, Greg 
N. Oliver, from the police records division. The next day, he 
returned to Spielmans's home with the photo of Oliver and showed 
it to Spielmans, advising him that he had reason to believe that 
Oliver was the same person Spielmans described. Spielmans 
identified Oliver as the man he had seen. 
Three days after the incident, Deputy Matthews assembled a 
photo spread, including the picture of Oliver and pictures of 
five other men. He showed the photo spread to Spielmans, who 
again identified Oliver as the suspect. Deputy Matthews also 
showed the photo spread to three of Spielmans's neighbors, two of 
whom identified Oliver as the person they had observed the day of 
the incident. 
Oliver was arrested and charged with one count of burglary, a 
second degree felony and one count of theft, a third degree 
felony. 
The trial judge granted two continuances prior to the case 
actually being tried. At the final pretrial conference, on 
August 28, 1989, Oliver's attorney told the trial judge that he 
was ready to proceed to trial and agreed to a trial date of 
September 5, 1989. 
After the pretrial conference, Oliver entered into plea 
negotiations with the State. The trial judge's clerk told both 
the State and Oliver's attorney, however, to prepare as if they 
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were going to trial as scheduled. The night before trial, Oliver 
agreed to the State's plea proposal and decided that he would 
enter a guilty plea in the morning rather than go to trial. The 
next morning, however, Oliver changed his mind and decided that 
he wanted to go to trial. Oliver's attorney moved for a one day 
continuance, stating that he needed more time to formally prepare 
for trial. The trial judge denied this motion. Oliver was 
convicted by a jury of one count of second degree burglary and 
one count of third degree theft. 
ISSUES 
On appeal Oliver argues that: (1) the trial court's denial of 
his motion for a continuance denied him due process of law; 
(2) the trial court's denial of his motion for a continuance 
denied him effective assistance of counsel; and (3) admissible 
evidence supports only a class A misdemeanor theft conviction. 
ANALYSIS 
Due Process 
Oliver argues that the trial court's denial of his motion for 
a one day continuance violated his right to due process because 
it forced his counsel to proceed to trial without being 
adequately prepared. Oliver asserts that his attorney did not 
conduct any formal trial preparation after Oliver decided to 
plead guilty. Consequently, when he changed his mind the next 
morning and decided he wanted to go to trial, Oliver's counsel 
was not sufficiently prepared. Oliver claims that had his 
attorney had one more day to prepare for trial, he would have 
been better prepared to: (1) support Oliver's testimony regarding 
his prior conviction based on misidentification; (2) expose 
weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony; and 
(3) support Oliver's assertions concerning possible police 
misconduct involved in the photo show up. 
The grant or denial of a continuance is within the discretion 
of the trial court. State v. Humphervs. 707 P.2d 109, 109 (Utah 
1985)(per curiam); State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 
1982); State v. Moosman, 542 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah 1975). This 
court will not reverse the trial court's decision absent a clear 
abuse of discretion. Id. 
When moving for a continuance, a party must show that denial 
of the motion will prevent the party from obtaining material and 
admissible evidence, that any additional witnesses it seeks can 
be produced within a reasonable time, and that it has exercised 
due diligence in preparing for the case before requesting the 
continuance. State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988). 
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Absent such showing, the trial court does not abuse its 
discretion if it denies the motion. Id. We are also persuaded 
by Washington precedent, that on appeal, the moving party must 
show that it was materially prejudiced by the court's denial of 
the continuance or that the trial result would have been 
different had the continuance been granted. State v. Barker, 667 
P.2d 108, 114 (Wash. App. 1983). 
Oliver has failed to make the necessary showing required by 
these cases. Oliver's counsel did not allege that there were any 
witnesses or evidence that he needed to obtain or that would have 
been available had the continuance been granted. Nor did he 
state specifically what he needed to do, or how or why Oliver 
would be prejudiced if he was denied the extra day. Defense 
counsel simply requested time to conduct more formal trial 
preparation. 
Oliver's counsel also failed to demonstrate that he exercised 
due diligence before requesting the continuance. Oliver's 
attorney represented Oliver at an arrest warrant hearing, the 
pretrial conference and throughout plea negotiations with the 
State. At the pretrial conference, eight days before trial, 
defense counsel told the trial judge that he was prepared to 
proceed to trial. After the pretrial, the trial judge instructed 
his court clerk to notify both the State and defense counsel 
that, although Oliver and the State were engaged in plea 
negotiations, they should prepare as if they were going to trial 
anyway. The trial judge stated that Oliver was having a hard 
time deciding whether or not he would accept the State's plea 
bargain and that no one would know until the day of trial whether 
or not he would actually enter a plea. In denying the motion, 
the trial judge stated: 
All counsel, prosecution and defense 
counsel were told that given circumstances, 
as I understand them, that Mr. Oliver could 
not make up his mind, that everyone needed to 
proceed, as if we were going to trial, and the 
responses we got from the respective offices 
of prosecution and defense is that they would 
act accordingly. 
On appeal, Oliver has failed to show that he was materially 
prejudiced by denial of this motion. The trial lasted two days, 
instead of only one, as scheduled. Therefore, Oliver's counsel 
had the evening of the first day and overnight to further prepare 
before the State's case had been fully presented. In essence, 
because the trial went two days, Oliver's counsel was afforded 
the time to prepare that he requested and which he would have had 
if the continuance had been granted. All of the State's 
witnesses were subject to recall by defense counsel and the trial 
judge found that defense counsel took full advantage of the 
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opportunity to cross-examine each of them. Also, because the 
motion was denied and the parties had to proceed to trial, one of 
the State1s witnesses was unable to appear. At the end of the 
State's case, the trial judge made the following statement 
regarding his denial of Oliver's motion for a continuance: 
Each of the witnesses who testified 
yesterday it seemed to me, that there was 
full availability of cross-examination by 
[defense counsel] and he took advantage of 
that . . . I want to make sure the record is 
very clear that full opportunity had been 
made available to the defendant, to the 
witnesses . . . and in fact, since the trial 
did not conclude in the first day, that there 
has been extra time to prepare, extra time to 
do whatever is necessary . . . . 
Furthermore, it appears to me that there 
may have been some benefit in the sense that 
this witness you mentioned, Mrs. Lehaman, is 
not available. 
Further, Oliver has not shown that the trial result would have 
been different had the continuance been granted. The record 
shows that Oliver's counsel explored all of the areas Oliver now 
complains of. Defense counsel questioned Oliver about his 
previous conviction based on eye witness misidentification, and 
again brought the prior misidentification to the juryfs attention 
during closing argument. He cross-examined each eyewitness who 
testified and addressed the weaknesses of each person's testimony 
at length in his closing argument. Defense counsel also cross-
examined Deputy Matthews about his investigation and the photo 
show up he conducted with at least one of the eyewitnesses. 
Oliver did not tell his attorney that he had decided to plead 
guilty until the night before trial. Any formal trial 
preparation should have been done before that time. Oliver does 
not show that he was materially prejudiced by the court's denial 
of this motion or that the trial would have been different had 
the continuance been granted. Therefore, we find that the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for a 
continuance and that such denial did not deprive Oliver of due 
process. 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
Oliver claims that the trial court's denial of his motion for 
a one day continuance denied him effective assistance of counsel. 
As in his due process argument, Oliver contends that his counsel 
was not sufficiently prepared to: (1) support Oliver's testimony 
regarding his prior conviction based on misidentification; 
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(2) expose weaknesses in the eyewitness identification testimony; 
or (3) support Oliver's assertions concerning possible police 
misconduct involved in the photo show up. Oliver argues that his 
counsel's failure to more fully explore these issues constitutes 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
In Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 
(1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-part 
test for determining whether a criminal defendant's sixth 
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel has been 
denied. The defendant must show: (1) that his or her counsel's 
performance was deficient; and (2) that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. Id. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. The 
defendant must prove both parts of the test in order to prevail. 
Id. 
An attorney's performance is deficient when it falls below the 
objective standard of reasonableness. Id. at 688, 104 S. Ct. at 
2064-65; State v. Temolin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990); State 
v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 893 (Utah 1989). The defendant must 
point to specific instances in the record which, under the 
circumstances, show that counsel's performance was deficient. 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066; Tempiin, 805 
P.2d at 186; State v. Hovt. 806 P.2d 204, 212 (Utah App. 1991). 
In assessing trial counsel's performance, an appellate court 
must "'indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance . . . .'" Tempiin. 805 P.2d at 186 (quoting 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065). 
Although Oliver points to three specific areas in which he 
claims his counsel should have been more prepared, the record, as 
discussed regarding Oliver's due process claims, establishes that 
his attorney presented evidence and argument to the jury in all 
of these areas. Any additional evidence would have been 
cumulative. Oliver has failed to demonstrate how his counsel's 
performance was deficient and therefore we need not address 
whether Oliver was prejudiced by such performance. We conclude 
that Oliver was not denied effective assistance of counsel. 
Admissibility of Evidence 
Oliver argues that the State failed to introduce admissible 
evidence establishing that the value of the stolen property 
totalled over $250 as required for a third degree felony theft 
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conviction under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(b) (1989)-1 
Spielmans reported that a watch, a ring, four one-dollar bills 
and four or five Canadian coins were stolen from his home. At 
trial, Spielmans testified that the watch was worth one hundred 
twenty-five dollars, the four dollar bills were worth four 
dollars and that the total value of the coins was approximately 
three dollars and seventy-five cents. When questioned about the 
ring's value, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. [THE PROSECUTOR]: And at the time that the 
ring was taken, did you have an opinion as to 
the value of that ring? 
A. [SPIELMANS]: I did have, and whatever that 
opinion was is reflected in the police report. 
I donft recall. 
Q: You do not recall? 
A: No. 
Q: Is there anything that would help refresh 
your recollection? 
A: Nothing other than the police report, I 
believe. 
Q: I'm asking you if looking at the police 
report refreshes your recollection as to the 
ring. 
A: As to the ring? 
Q: As to the ring. Thank you. 
A: I'm sure it reflects what I said. I just 
don't recall. 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1) (1989) provides: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this dqXac 
shall be punishable: 
. . . 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more than 
$250 but not more than $1000; 
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Q: . . . Having looked at this report, this police 
report, does that refresh your recollection 
as to how you valued the ring at that time? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Okay. What was the value you placed on that ring 
at that time? 
A: I really can't recall. It states $200 on there. 
That's what I said. If it says $200 on there, that's 
what I said. 
The police report was not introduced into evidence. 
Oliver claims that Spielmans's testimony, based on the police 
report, that the ring was worth $200 is inadmissible because 
Spielmans lacked personal knowledge of the value and his memory 
was not refreshed by the police report. Therefore, Oliver 
contends that the State proved a total value of less than $250 
for the stolen property, which constitutes a class A misdemeanor 
under § 76-6-412(1)(c)2, rather than a felony. 
The State argues that the evidence presented is sufficient to 
sustain the felony conviction. Before we can assess whether the 
evidence is sufficient to support a felony theft conviction, we 
must first determine whether the evidence that the ring was worth 
$200 was properly admitted, as that evidence is necessary for a 
felony conviction. 
In reviewing a trial court's decision to admit evidence, we 
will not reverse that ruling unless a substantial right of the 
party has been affected. State v. Morgan, 162 Utah Adv. Rep. 61, 
61 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Salt Lake Citv, v. Holtman, 806 P.2d 
235, 237 (Utah App. 1991)); Utah R. Evid. 103(a). 
Under Utah Rule of Evidence 602, a witness may only testify 
about matters of which the witness has personal knowledge. A 
witness may use a writing to refresh his or her memory for the 
purpose of testifying. Utah R. Evid. 612(1). 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412(1)(c) (1989) provides: 
(1) Theft of property and services as provided in this d-qpba: 
shall be punishable: 
• • • 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was more than $100 but does not 
exceed $250; 
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It is evident from the trial transcript that Spielmans had no 
independent knowledge or memory of the value of the ring, nor was 
his memory refreshed after looking at the police report. He had 
no present personal knowledge of the ring's value and, therefore, 
his testimony concerning the value is inadmissible. We find that 
admissible evidence supports only a class A misdemeanor theft 
conviction. Therefore, we reverse and remand on the felony theft 
conviction issue. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the trial court's 
denial of the motion for a continuance, and reverse and remand on 
the felony theft conviction for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Norman H. Jackso 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No, 890625-CA 
v. : 
GREG N. OLIVER, : Category No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for burglary, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1990) and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990). This Court has jurisdiction to hear 
the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 
1990). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Was the trial court's denial of defendant's 
requested one day continuance proper? The granting of a 
continuance is at the discretion of the trial court, whose 
decision a reviewing court will not reverse unless it is 
demonstrated that the decision constituted an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Humphervs, 707 P.2d 109 (Utah 1985); State 
v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988). 
2. Was defendant adequately represented at trial in 
accord with his sixth amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel? Review of this issue is based on a determination of 
whether counsel's performance was deficient and, if so, whether 
the deficient performance prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 
401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
3. Did the trial court correctly determine that 
Spielmans's testimony concerning the value of the gold ring was 
sufficient to establish the ring's value? When a defendant 
claims there was insufficient evidence to warrant sending the 
case to the jury, a reviewing court will uphold the trial court's 
decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all inferences that 
can be reasonably drawn from it, some evidence exists from which 
a reasonable jury could find that the elements for .the crime had 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Dibello, 7 80 
P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon which the State 
relies is included in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Greg N. Oliver, was charged in an amended 
information1 filed February 7, 1989, with one count of burglary, 
a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1990) and theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (Record [hereinafter R.] at 8). 
1
 Defendant was originally charged with the additional 
offense of being a habitual criminal in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-1001 (1990); however, that charge was subsequently 
dropped (R. at 6-8). 
-2-
Defense counsel, Lynn R. Brown of Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association (SLLDA),2 filed a motion to suppress the 
eyewitness identification of the victim witness, John Spielmans, 
on the ground that the identification was made after Spielmans 
was shown a single photograph of defendant (R. at 36). After a 
hearing on the matter held April 28, 1989, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion on the ground that the "totality of the 
circumstances" surrounding Spielmans's identification of 
defendant failed to demonstrate that any "misidentification" had 
taken place (R. at 64; Transcript of suppression hearing, April 
28, 1989 [hereinafter S.H.] at 289-91; a copy of the trial 
court's oral findings is attached hereto as Addendum A). 
Prior to trial on September 5, 1989, defense counsel, 
Steven R. McCaughey, asked for a one day continuance on the 
ground that he had not done "any formal trial preparation" 
because he had anticipated defendant would enter a guilty plea to 
a reduced charge (T. at 3). The trial court denied the motion on 
the ground that McCaughey had previously informed the court that 
he would be ready to proceed with trial as scheduled at the 
pretrial conference held August 28, 1989. In denying defendant's 
motion, the trial court expressly noted the problem had been 
2
 Although defendant was originally represented by SLLDA (R. 
at 19-20), he also retained private counsel, Steven R. McCaughey, 
who first appeared on defendant's behalf at an August 7, 1989, 
hearing on a bench warrant which had been issued for defendant's 
arrest (R. at 92). On August 25, 1989, SLLDA filed a motion to 
withdraw as defense counsel on the ground that defendant had 
hired McCaughey to represent him in future proceedings (R. at 
93). 
-3-
"created" by defendant who was unable to "make up his mind" 
concerning the proffered plea bargain (R. at 8). Thus, the court 
further noted, "everyone needed to proceed, [as] if we were going 
to trial . . . ." (R. at 8-9). 
Following the two day jury trial conducted September 5-
6, 1989, defendant was convicted as charged (R. at 162-63). 
Defendant was sentenced on October 16, 1989, to an indeterminate 
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years and 
ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $1,340.06 for the 
burglary count. He received an indeterminate sentence not to 
exceed five years for the theft count, all terms to run 
concurrently (R. at 166-67). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
At approximately 2:30 p.m., on the afternoon of January 
7, 1989, the victim, John Spielmans, returned home from a 
basketball game with his son (T. at 22). After parking his car 
in the driveway, Spielmans proceeded to walk toward the front 
door of his home when he noticed that a side door to his garage 
was open (T. at 22-23). Spielmans usually kept the door locked 
and he remembered that the door had been closed when he left 
earlier that afternoon (T. at 23). Upon entering the garage and 
looking around, Spielmans noticed a bike seat missing from one of 
the bikes stored in the garage (R. at 23-24). As Spielmans 
walked toward the bike, located beneath the garage window, he 
observed an individual vaulting the gate of a chain link fence 
approximately 10-12 feet away (T. at 23-23-24). Spielmans 
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watched the individual head north and then exited the garage and 
began following him (T. at 24). After losing sight of the 
person, Spielmans returned to his front door and noticed that it 
was "somewhat mangled" in the vicinity of the lock (T. at 25). 
Spielmans's son indicated that he believed someone had been 
inside the home (T. at 25). Standing in his front yard, 
Spielmans telephoned 911 on his cordless phone (T. at 26). After 
completing the call, Spielmans remained standing outside his home 
(T. at 26). At that time, a neighbor drew his attention to a 
person pressed up against a wooden fence across the street (T. at 
26, 76). Based on the similarity of that person's clothing to 
the individual he had earlier observed, Spielmans concluded it 
was the same person he had seen vaulting the fence (T. at 26-27, 
63).3 
Spielmans proceeded toward the person, who began 
running in a southerly direction along the fence towards a 
vehicle parked nearby (T. at 28, 34-35). Although Spielmans 
attempted to intercept the individual, he was not successful and 
the individual entered the driver's side of the vehicle, just as 
Spielmans approached the rear of the driver's side of the vehicle 
(T. at 35-36). As he climbed in the car, the individual looked 
3
 It is not clear from the record whether Spielmans 
described the suspect in his call to 911; however, it is clear 
that Spielmans described the individual he had observed to the 
investigating officer, Deputy Kevin Matthews of the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff's Department, the day of the incident (T. at 27, 
104). Spielmans described the individual as wearing a levi 
jacket, gold colored wire-rim glasses with clear lenses, and 
having long blonde hair which extended below a navy blue or black 
watchman type cap (T. at 27, 61-64). 
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over his left shoulder toward Spielmans and stated, "It wasn't 
me, man" before driving off (T. at 35-36). Spielmans then 
returned to his own yard where he again called 911 from his 
cordless telephone and described the vehicle including the 
license plate number and its direction of travel (T. at 42). 
Shortly thereafter, Deputy Matthews arrived to investigate the 
crime (T. at 42). Spielmans described the individual he had 
observed to Deputy Matthews (see n.3, supra; T. at 104 )A as well 
as the vehicle5 he had driven away in, including the license 
plate number (T. at 105). He also identified some missing items 
including a watch, gold ring, four $1 dollar bills and four or 
five gold Canadian coins (T. at '42, 71).6 
As part of his investigation that day, Deputy Matthews 
also talked with Spielmans's neighbor, Robert R. Rufener, who 
lived two houses east of Spielmans (T. at 84, 102-103). Rufener 
observed an individual he described as having long blond hair, a 
A
 Deputy Matthews testified that Spielmans described a 
white male between the ages of 25-30 years old, approximately 
five feet, ten inches tall, weighing approximately 180 pounds, 
with blond curly hair and wearing wire rim glasses, black gloves 
and a blue watchman-type hat (T. at 104-05). On cross-
examination, Spielmans did not recall describing the individual's 
height or weight to Deputy Matthews (T. at 61-62). 
5
 Spielmans described the vehicle as a white over red, 
older model Monte Carlo (T. at 105). 
6
 Spielmans testified that at the time of the burglary he 
believed the watch to be worth approximately $125, the gold ring 
to be worth approximately $200 and the Canadian gold coins to be 
worth approximately $.75 each (T. at 48-50). 
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mustache and wearing dark levi type clothing,7 cut west across 
his front yard and then north across the street and west through 
another yard before the individual hopped in a nearby car and 
"sped away" (T. at 85-93; 105). Rufener described the same 
vehicle as Spielmans (T. at 105). 
Based on the foregoing information, Deputy Matthews 
ran a computer check on the license plate of the vehicle and came 
up with an address and the vehicle owner's name8 (T. at 108). 
Deputy Matthews then proceeded to the vicinity of that address 
for further investigation (T. at 108). When he did not observe 
the suspect vehicle parked at the address he was investigating, 
Deputy Matthews parked his police vehicle and walked to a 
neighboring address (T. at 108). While he was speaking with 
residents of the neighboring house, Deputy Matthews observed an 
individual fitting the suspect's description leave the "residence 
the suspect vehicle was registered to" (T. at 109). According to 
Deputy Matthews, the suspect and a companion first became aware 
of his presence when the companion commented, "That looks like a 
cop car down the street" (T. at 113, 119). The suspect then 
7
 Rufener testified that the person he observed was not 
wearing glasses (T. at 93). 
8
 State's witness, Karen C. Weed, the registered owner of a 
1976 Monte Carlo, which she described as being brown with gray 
primer spots and rust, testified that defendant frequently drove 
the Monte Carlo and that he had driven it the day of the 
incident, January 7, 1989 (T. at 177). She further testified 
that she had known defendant five years during which time he wore 
corrective glasses and that she believed defendant owned a pair 
of gold wire rimmed glasses on the day of the incident (T. at 
181). 
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began to hurry towards a green Oldsmobile Cutlass parked in the 
street facing north (T. at 113-115)• As he entered the green 
Oldsmobile, the suspect looked at Deputy Matthews (who had exited 
the neighboring house) with a look of shock on his face and drove 
away (T. at 112-113). Deputy Matthews, similarly hurried toward 
his vehicle and attempted to give chase (T. at 115). He was able 
to follow the green Oldsmobile for approximately a quarter of a 
mile as it accelerated on the slick roads, exceeding the speed 
limit by approximately 10-15 m.p.h., and occasionally swerved out 
of control (T. at 115-16). 
Based on his own observations, the license plate 
number of the green Oldsmobile, and the descriptions of both 
Spielmans and Rufener, Deputy Matthews subsequently obtained a 
picture of defendant from the records division (T. at 116; S.H. 
at 264). The next day, January 8, 1989, Deputy Matthews returned 
to the Spielmans's home with the photo of defendant and showed it 
to Spielmans, advising him that he (Matthews) had reason to 
believe that the person in the photo was the same person 
Spielmans had previously described (T. at 116-17). According to 
Deputy Matthews, Spielmans then looked at the photo and "took his 
finger against the picture and said, 'That's the guy'" (T. at 
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117 ).9 No other witnesses were shown the single photograph of 
defendant (T. at 117, 122-23).10 
Approximately three days after the incident, Deputy 
Matthews put together a photo spread, including a picture of 
defendant and five other individuals (T. at 118). That photo 
spread was subsequently shown to Speilmans who again identified 
defendant as the suspect (T. at 54-61, 127).u No other photos 
9
 Spielmans testified that he merely indicated that the 
individual in the picture "appeared to be" the same person he had 
observed running from his yard (T. at 52, 66). Spielmans further 
testified that Deputy Matthews refused to tell him the name of 
the suspect in the photo and that he only became aware of 
defendant's identity after looking at a photo spread shown to him 
two or three days later (T. at 69). 
Matthews testified that he only showed Spielmans the 
single photograph of defendant because he knew Spielmans worked 
at Adult Parole and Probation and because Spielmans had 
previously informed Matthews that he probably knew the suspect 
that fled from his home (T. at 124-25). 
10
 Defenc i asserts that Deputy Matthews's written report 
of his investigation suggests that the single photograph was 
shown to all the witnesses; however, a copy of the police report 
has not been included in the record on appeal. Moreover, Deputy 
Matthews testified that notwithstanding the language of the 
police report, he only showed the single photo of defendant to 
Spielmans and possibly Spielmans's son (T. at 122-23). 
11
 Specifically, Spielmans identified the center picture of 
the top row of the photo spread which was received into evidence 
as State's exhibit #15 (T. at 60-61). Because the prosecutor did 
not elicit a repponse from Spielmans at trial that the center 
picture of the op row was in fact a photo of defendant, and 
because State'£ exhibit #15 has not been included in the record 
on appeal, the State assumes that the center picture in the top 
row was in fact a photo of defendant, based on the lack of 
objection and/or cross-examination of Spielmans from defense 
counsel concerning Spielmans's identification of that particular 
photo as the perpetrator (T. at 61-70). Significantly, the 
prosecutor did elicit a response from Spielmans at the 
suppression hearing that the center picture of the top row of the 
photo spread was a picture of defendant (S.H. at 232). 
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were shown to Spielmans in between the time Deputy Matthews 
showed him the single photo of defendant and the time he picked 
defendant's picture out of the photo spread (T. at 69).12 
Spielmans identified defendant again at a subsequent lineup, as 
well as in court (T. at 55-58)• 
In addition to Spielmans, the photo spread was shown to 
several of Spielmans's neighbors, including Rufener, who 
similarly identified defendant as the person he had observed the 
day of the incident (T. at 90).13 At a subsequent lineup, 
Rufener again identified defendant (T. at 91-92, see State's 
exhibit #16).1A He was also able to positively identify 
defendant in court during trial (T. at 92). 
12
 At trial, Spielmans did not recall whether the single 
photo of defendant he was shown by Matthews was the same photo 
used in the photo spread (T. at 67). However, at the suppression 
hearing Spielmans appeared to testify that the photo used in the 
subsequent photo spread was the same photo Deputy had shown to 
him on January 8, 1989 (S.H. at 229-30). 
13
 Rufener, like Spielmans, identified the center picture of 
the top row (T. at 90). As before, the State assumes that the 
center picture in the top row was in fact a photo of defendant 
based on the lack of objection and/or cross-examination of 
Rufener from defense counsel concerning Rufener's identification 
of that particular photo as the perpetrator (T. at 93). See 
n.11, supra. 
14
 Although a photo of a lineup is included among the 
exhibits in the record on appeal, that photo (State's exhibit 
#13) was not received into evidence (T. at 55-57). It is not 
entirely clear from the record whether Rufener's lineup 
identification card, received into evidence as State's exhibit 
#16, relates to State's exhibit #13, or another photo of another 
lineup, or both. In any event, no photo of a lineup was received 
into evidence (T. at 2a, 55-57). Therefore, the State assumes, 
based on the lack of objection or cross-examination from defense 
counsel concerning Rufener's testimony regarding his lineup 
identification, that Rufener identified defendant at that time 
(T. at 93-95, defense counsel's cross examination of Rufener). 
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Lou Carol Roberts, another neighbor, was also shown the 
photo spread a few days after the incident (T. at 77-78). 
Roberts, whose house was apparently "two doors" down from 
Spielmans,13 was in her backyard cutting wood the day of the 
incident, when she observed an individual she described as having 
long blond hair, short over the ears and longer in back running 
through her yard (T. at 74-75). Roberts asked, "Who are you?", 
to which the individual responded, "My car broke down." Roberts 
replied, "Well, who are you?" At that point the individual ran 
and jumped over the fence and into another neighbor's yard (T. at 
74). Roberts saw the same individual again a short time later 
while she was standing in her front yard talking with a neighbor 
about the incident, at which time she alerted Spielmans, who was 
standing in his yard, to the suspect across the street (T. at 
76). Like Spielmans and Rufener, Roberts identified the middle 
picture in the top row as the person she had observed the day of 
the incident (T. at 77-80).16 At a subsequent lineup, Roberts 
Although it is not entirely clear from the record, it is 
a reasonable inference from the testimony of Deputy Matthews and 
the victim, John Spielmans, that Roberts's house was located 
north of the Spielmans home on Birch Drive, which street runs in 
a north and south direction (T. at 24 (Spielmans watched the 
suspect head north); 107 (Matthews observed footprints leading 
away from Spielmans's backyard in a northerly direction toward 
the Roberts home)). 
16
 Based on the reasons previously stated in n.ll and n.13 
supra, as well as on the lack cf objection and/or cross 
examination from defense counsel concerning Roberts's testimony 
on this point, the State assumes that the picture Roberts 
identified in the photo spread was in fact a picture of defendant 
(T. at 79-81, defense counsel's cross examination of Roberts). 
Significantly, Roberts testified that she was never shown the 
single photo of defendant and that she was not told whether in 
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was unable to pick out the person she had seen the day of the 
incident because it had simply been too long ago17 (T. at 79). 
John R. Call, a neighbor who happened to be driving 
past the Rufener house the day of the incident, was also shown 
the photo spread a few days later (T. at 99). Although he was 
able to pick out two possible suspects, he was unable to exactly 
identify the individual he had observed the day of the incident 
(T. at 99).18 He was similarly unable to identify the 
individual with certainty at a subsequent lineup (T. at 100). 
See n.17 supra. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant has not demonstrated that he was denied due 
process by the trial court's denial of his request for a one day 
continuance; nor has he demonstrated that he was denied the 
effective assistance of trial counsel. First, defendant made no 
argument to the trial court that he needed more time to obtain 
material and admissible evidence, that such evidence could 
fact the suspect's picture was included in the photo spread (T. 
at 79-80) . 
17
 It appears from the record that there was a 12 week 
interval between the time the witnesses were shown the photo 
spread and the time of the lineup (P.H. at 285). 
18
 Call had been driving down Ash Circle past the Rufener 
residence when a man dashed out from behind a fence and ran in 
front of his car (T. at 96). Call had to slam on his brakes to 
keep from hitting the individual who ran across the street to a 
car parked facing east, in between the Rufener residence and the 
west line of the Roberts residence (T. at 97). Call described 
the individual he had seen as being in his late 20's or early 
30's with long blond hair and an athletic build (T. at 98). Call 
described the car as a 2-door slanting hatch-back with gray spots 
which appeared to have been primed for painting (T. at 98). 
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actually be produced within a reasonable time, or that he had 
exercised due diligence before requesting the continuance. 
Where, as here, the sole ground presented to the trial court in 
support of defendant's requested one day continuance was the need 
for more "formal" trial preparation, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying the motion. 
Second, defendant has failed to provide record support 
for his wholly speculative allegations of ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel. Not one of defendant's allegations 
demonstrates either deficient performance or prejudice. 
Moreover, the record before this Court is totally devoid of any 
indication that trial counsel's performance was hindered in any 
manner by the trial court's denial of his request for a one day 
continuance. Because defendant has failed to point to any 
specific, identified acts or omissions that fall outside the wide 
range of professionally competent assistance, his allegations of 
ineffectiveness are without merit. 
Finally, defendant appears to allege that the evidence 
of value introduced at trial is insufficient to support his 
conviction for third degree felony theft. However, because 
defendant has failed to provide this Court with any meaningful 
legal analysis or authority concerning his claim, this Court may 
properly decline to consider the merits of defendant's 
allegation. 
Even assuming this Court determines that defendant's 
analysis of the issue merits review, the evidence of value 
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introduced at trial is sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction for felony theft. Contrary to defendant's apparent 
assertion, it is not necessary that the victim independently 
recall the value of the stolen property to properly establish its 
value. Where, as here, the victim had "forgotten" his previous 
valuation of the property, his testimony concerning his prior 
statement of value as recorded in a police report was clearly 
admissible nonhearsay. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY THE 
TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF HIS REQUEST FOR A ONE 
DAY CONTINUANCE; NOR WAS HE DENIED THE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Defendant asserts that he was denied due process and 
the effective assistance of counsel during his two day jury trial 
because the trial court refused to grant defense counsel's 
request for a one day continuance (Br. of App. at 14). In so 
phrasing his argument, defendant mixes two distinct legal 
questions. Defendant's challenge to the trial court's denial of 
the requested continuance requires this Court to consider whether 
the denial was an abuse of the trial court's discretion. State 
v. Humphervs, 707 P.2d 109, 109-110 (Utah 1985). Defendant's 
challenge to the effectiveness of trial counsel, on the other 
hand, requires this Court to determine whether trial counsel's 
performance was deficient and, if so, whether that performance 
prejudiced defendant at trial. State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 
893 (Utah 1989). Therefore, for purposes of clarity the State 
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will present separate analysis, first addressing defendant's 
claim that he was denied due process by the trial court's denial 
of his request for a one day continuance. Second, the State will 
address defendant's apparent allegation that trial counsel's 
pretrial preparation was deficient and prejudicial. 
A. The trial court's denial of defendant's 
request for a one day continuance was proper. 
Prior to the first day of trial on September 5, 1989, 
defense counsel, Steven R. McCaughey, asked for a one day 
continuance on the ground that he had not done "any formal trial 
preparation" because he had anticipated defendant would enter a 
guilty plea to a reduced charge (T. at 3-4). The trial court 
denied the motion, expressly noting that the trial date had 
already been continued twice, once at the request of defendant's 
previous defense counsel, Lynn R. Brown, and once due to the non-
appearance of defendant (T. at 4-5). The court further noted 
that McCaughey had previously informed the court that he would be 
ready to proceed with trial as scheduled at the pretrial 
conference held August 28, 1989 (T. at 5; Transcript of pretrial 
conference, April 28, 1989 [hereinafter P.T.] at ll).19 
Finally, the court noted that the problem had been "created" by 
defendant who was unable to "make up his mind" concerning the 
proffered plea bargain (T. at 8). Thus, the court concluded, 
19
 Apparently, both the final pretrial conference, as well 
as the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress were held on 
August 28, 1989. The transcript of the pretrial conference is 
contained in a separate "supplement index" which is a volume 
different from the one containing the transcript of the 
suppression hearing. 
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"everyone needed to proceed, [as] if we were going to trial" (T. 
at 8-9 ).20 
"It is well established in Utah, as elsewhere, that the 
granting of a continuance is at the discretion of the trial 
judge," whose decision this Court will not reverse unless it is 
demonstrated that the decision constituted an abuse of 
discretion, Humphervs, 707 P.2d at 109 (citations omitted); 
State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1387 (Utah 1988). See also State 
20
 Moreover, at the conclusion of the State's case in chief, 
the trial court made the following observations concerning his 
previous denial of defendant's requested continuance: 
Each of the witnesses who testified 
yesterday, it seemed to me, that there was 
full availability of cross-examination by Mr, 
McCaughey and he took advantage of that. One 
of the reasons why I wanted to make sure 
whether or not Mr, McCaughey wanted the 
witnesses back was in the event there was any 
appeal on this question of a continuance, I 
want to make sure the record is very clear 
that full opportunity had been made available 
to the defendant, to the witnesses, and all 
of which indicates to me that where I think 
I'm absolutely correct on denying the motion 
to a continuance, even if for some reason, 
I'm wrong, is it's very clear -chat any error 
has been harmless in the sense that full 
access has been had to witnesses, and in 
fact, since the trial did not conclude in the 
first day, that there has been extra time to 
prepare, extra time to do whatever is 
necessary, so that there's no conditions of 
denial on the motion for continuance, except 
for moving the case along, which is a 
bearable factor. 
Furthermore, it appears to me that there may 
have been some benefit in the sense that this 
witness you mentioned, Mrs. Lehman, is not 
available, 
(T. at 146) . 
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v. Barker, 35 Wash. App. 388, 667 P.2d 108, 114 (Wash. App. 1983) 
(noting that the test is the same "even though the constitutional 
issue of effective assistance of counsel is involved") (citation 
omitted)). Although "[a]buse may be found where a party has made 
timely objections, given necessary notice and made a reasonable 
effort to have the trial date reset for good cause," defendant 
has not demonstrated that the above criteria were met in this 
case. State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) 
(citation omitted). Defendant made no argument to the trial 
court that he needed more time to obtain material and admissible 
evidence, that such evidence could actually be produced within a 
reasonable time, or that he had exercised due diligence before 
requesting the continuance. .Id.* Where, as here, the sole ground 
presented to the trial court in support of defendant's requested 
one day continuance was the need for more "formal preparation," 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the 
motion. IcL at 753 (noting that review of the propriety of the 
trial ccart's action was necessarily confined to those issues and 
documents before the trial court at the time of the denial of the 
motion). See also State v. Jackson, 637 P.2d 887, 888 (Okla. Cr. 
App. 1981) (noting that record failed to demonstrate that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying a continuance on the 
ground that defendant needed more time to prepare). 
B. Defendant was effectively represented at trial. 
As a result of the trial court's denial of his 
requested one day continuance, defendant asserts that his trial 
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counsel failed to (1) present additional evidence regarding a 
previous case in which defendant had been misidentified; (2) more 
fully explore alleged weaknesses in the eyewitness 
identifications in the present case; (3) present additional 
evidence to contradict Officer Matthews's testimony that he 
observed defendant the day of the incident and (4) present 
evidence in support of defendant's testimony (Br. of App. 21-26). 
Defendant levels these allegations with no record support 
demonstrating that trial counsel's pretrial preparation was 
either deficient or prejudicial. 
A defendant who raises a claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel must show both that counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner and that a 
reasonable probability exists that but for counsel's deficient 
performance, the result of the trial would have been different. 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Carter, 776 P.2d 
at 893; State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). A 
"[d]efendant must prove that specific, identified acts or 
omissions fall outside the wide range of professionally competent 
assistance. The claim may not be speculative, but must be a 
demonstrative reality[.]" Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. And, the 
deficient performance must be so prejudicial as "to undermine 
confidence in the reliability of the verdict." Id. 
Here, not one of defendant's allegations meets either 
the deficient performance prong or the prejudice prong of the 
Strickland test. Rather, the record before this Court is totally 
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devoid of any indication that trial counsel's performance was 
hindered in any manner by the trial court's denial of his request 
for a one day continuance.21 Defendant's wholly speculative 
assertions concerning what trial counsel "could have addressed," 
together with his lack of record support, fail to demonstrate 
either deficient performance or prejudice to his defense. 
Because defendant has failed to point to any specific, identified 
acts or omissions that fall outside the wide range of 
professionally competent assistance, his allegations of 
ineffectiveness are without merit. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S ALLEGATION IN POINT II OF HIS 
BRIEF HAS NOT BEEN PROPERLY PRESENTED TO THIS 
COURT; ALTERNATIVELY, THE EVIDENCE OF VALUE 
INTRODUCED AT TRIAL IS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT 
DEFENDANT'S FELONY THEFT CONVICTION. 
Defendant appears to assert that evidence of the value 
of the stolen property is insufficient to support his third 
degree felony conviction; therefore, the trial court should have 
granted trial counsel's motion to reduce the felony theft charge 
tc a misdemeanor. In support of his claim defendant merely notes 
that Spielmans "never indicated personal knowledge" concerning 
the value of the ring, and that the police report was not 
admitted into evidence (Br. of App. at 27).22 "Thus," defendant 
21
 See n.20 supra. 
22
 Although defendant cites State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 
298 (Utah 1990), for the proposition that police reports are not 
generally admissible under the business and public records 
exceptions to the hearsay rule, that exception to the hearsay 
rule is not at issue in this case (Br. of App. at 27). 
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concludes, "it appears that the approximate value of the property 
properly established by the State" was insufficient to support a 
charge of felony theft (Br. of App. at 27). As for his analysis 
of the trial court's denial of his motion to reduce the felony 
theft charge, defendant vaguely asserts that "[t]his Court's 
review of Mr. Spielmans' testimony will reveal that the trial 
court's finding was clearly erroneous" (Br. of App. at 28). 
Because defendant has failed to provide this Court with any 
meaningful legal analysis or authority concerning his claim, this 
Court may properly decline to consider the merits of defendant's 
allegations. State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984). 
Even assuming this Court determines that defendant's 
analysis of the issue merits review, the evidence of value 
introduced at trial is sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction for felony theft pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-412 
(1990).23 The trial court found that the total value of the 
stolen property was $335 (T. at 143), which value clearly meets 
the value element of third degree felony theft. See n.23 supra. 
On appeal to this Court, defendant appears to attack the trial 
court's finding only insofar as it is supported by Spielmans's 
23
 Section 76-6-412 provides in pertinent part: 
(1) Theft of property and services as 
provided in this chapter shall be punishable: 
. • . . 
(b) as a felony of the third degree if the: 
(i) value of the property or services is more 
than $250 but not more than $1,000. . . . 
(c) as a class A misdemeanor if the value of 
the property stolen was more than $100 but 
does not exceed $250. . . . 
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testimony concerning a gold ring which Spielmans valued at $200 
(T. at 50). Because Spielmans was unable to independently recall 
the value of the gold ring, defendant appears to assert that the 
total value of the stolen items amounts to only approximately 
$140 (Br. of App. at 27). 
However, contrary to defendant's assertion, it was not 
necessary for Spielmans to independently recall at trial the 
value of the gold ring to properly establish its value. 
Spielmans testimony concerning his previous valuation of the ring 
was clearly admissible nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(1)(A) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence which provides: 
(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A 
statement is not hearsay if: 
(1) The declarant testifies at the trial or 
hearing and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement and the statement is 
(A) inconsistent with his testimony or the 
witness denies having made the statement or 
has forgotten. . . . 
Although he was unable to independently recall the exact value of 
the ring at trial, Spielmans testified that he had previously 
given a value for the ring which was recorded in Officer 
Matthews's report (T. at 49-50). After reading over the report, 
Spielmans testified without objection that, "I really can't 
recall. It states $200 on there. That's what I said. If it 
says $200 on there, that's what I said" (T. at 50). 
Significantly, defendant does not appear to dispute the value of 
the ring as reflected in the police report; rather, defendant 
merely objects to the fact that Spielmans was unable to 
independently recall the value he had previously given for the 
-21-
ring (Br, of App. at 27). Because Spielmans had forgotten the 
value he had previously given for the gold ring, it was 
permissible for him to testify concerning his prior statement of 
value as contained in the police report. In light of Spielmans's 
testimony based on the police report, it was not necessary that 
the actual report be introduced into evidence. Assuming the 
police report had been offered, the trial court could have 
properly received it into evidence pursuant to the nonhearsay 
rule. State v. Calamity, 735 P.2d 39, 42 (Utah 1987) (where 
prosecution witness could not remember some of the events 
recounted in a prior written statement, the trial court properly 
received prior statement into evidence under rule 801(d)(1)(A)). 
Thus, defendant's allegations concerning the propriety of 
Spielmans's testimony are without merit. 
Admittedly the trial court denied defendant's motion to 
reduce the felony theft on grounds other than those stated 
above.24 Although Spielmans's testimony concerning the value of 
24
 Specifically, the trial court stated: 
Well, let me just indicate this, that I agree 
that at best, from your client's perspective, 
his testimony was a bit garbled. However, I 
believe that his testimony on refreshing his 
recollection, although he did not use the 
magic words that refresh your recollection, 
that he did confirm that that refreshed his 
view of the value at the time, the $200. And 
I was listening to that testimony closely as 
it came in, and it was right at the end of 
that submatter that he finally kind of 
stumbled into it. And therefore, the motion 
will be denied. 
(T. at 143-44). 
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the gold ring would be admissible on either ground, it is not 
entirely clear from the record that Spielmans's memory was 
refreshed by the police report (T. at 50)• However, this Court 
may sustain a trial court's evidentiary ruling on any available 
ground, even though the trial court assigned another reason for 
its ruling. State v. Galleqos, 712 P.2d 207, 209 (Utah 1985) 
(citing State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985)). Because 
Spielmans's prior statement as recorded in the police report is 
clearly admissible nonhearsay pursuant to rule 801(d)(1)(A), this 
Court may properly affirm the trial court's ruling on that 
ground. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
this Court to affirm defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this c3# day of April, 1991. 
PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney Gene 
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ADDENDUM A 
1 like I say, I haven't had the benefit of her cases yet. 
2 But under the totality of the circumstances, there is no 
3 demonstrated need to do what he did here, and as a result, 
4 it should be suppressed. 
5 THE COURT: All right. I am prepared to rule in 
6 this case. 
7 I have looked at the Biggers case and I will give 
8 you an opportunity on down the pike, when it's convenient, 
9 Mr. Brown, to indicate to me that Biggers is not the 
10 applicable law in this case. 
11 But it does appear to me to be applicable and 
12 controlling in this particular circumstances. The showup, 
13 if that is the right term, was not the best practice, and 
14 is something that should not occur. However, this court, 
15 unlike the Utah Supreme Court, is not one that has 
15 supervisory power over other courts. Nor is it one that 
17 has supervisory power of misconduct. 
18 What I do is not precedent. What I do is rule in 
19 a particular case. Those other things are for our courts 
20 at other times. And what I am supposed to do in this 
2i part.^ular case is determine from the totality of the 
22 circumstances whether or not these circumstances present a 
23 situation where there is the likelihood of 
24 misidentification. Showups can present circumstances where 
25 there is a likelihood of misidentification. 
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In this case, however, that did not occur. If 
Officer Matthews had been arbitrary or capricious in 
selecting the particular individual picture to be shown, 
then there might be more difficulty, or there would 
certainly be some difficulty here. However, the way the 
picture was selected at least gives the court some 
assurance that there is not a misidentification here. 
Furthermore, testimony of Mr. Spielmans indicated 
that two to three months later, in March of this year, 
there was an identification that was related back to his 
original citing of the person he has identified as the 
defendant, rather than tracing it back to the showing of 
the picture to him by Mr. Matthews. 
I don't think this is a circumstance where we 
have a constitutional right involved. It doesn't rise to 
that level, and it is my feeling that in this particular 
case, because there is no constitutional deprivation and 
because there has been no violation of the statute or a 
rule, that the proper way for this identification to be 
challenged is by cross-examination of the witnesses in 
front of a jury and to present to that jury the factors 
under the standard set in State vs. Long for them to make a 
determination as to identification. 
And as you know, Mr. Brown, from a case you tried 
in front of me, State vs. Root, I believe it was, is that 
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1 that is a formidable weapon in the arsenal of defending 
2 people from charges, because juries are concerned about 
3 witness identification and they do take that into 
4 consideration. 
5 So for the reasons I have stated, the motion to 
6 suppress is denied. 
7 Do we have this case scheduled? 
8 I MR. BROWN: Yes, Your Honor. It is set for trial 
9 on May 31, and for pretrial on March 22. 
10 THE COURT: All right. Is there anything further 
11 at this time? 
12 MS. BYRNE: Nothing further from the state, Your 
13 Honor. 
14 I MR. BROWN: The court indicated that you would 
15 consider more argument on this after I have— 
15 THE COURT: Yes. You indicated to me that you 
hadn't had an opportunity to see those cases. 
MR. BROWN: I expect to do so at the pretrial. 
THE COURT: Thatfs fine. We will hear you out 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
then. 
MR. BROWN: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Let me hand back to Ms. Byrne the 
cases or the copies of the cases she gave me so that she 
can give them back to me at the pretrial, because otherwise 
they will get lost. 
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